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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
A. Introduction
Zimbabwe held a crucial Presidential Election from the 9th to the March
11, 2002. The election was momentous because it was preceded by cataclysmic
events in the country's post-colonial scene. The election attracted such singular
international attention that the question of sovereignty that had never been
raised vis-a-vis the conduct of elections became a topical issue in Zimbabwe and
other countries. Furthermore, human rights fears that had characterized the
2000 parliamentary elections paled into insignificance by comparison.'
The importance of these elections provides more evidence when we
consider that more than a year later, the political crisis in the country was far
from over. This article is an attempt to critique the presidential election in the
light of international human rights standards guiding electoral practices. This
article also measures electoral practices against democratic norms prevailing in
the global environment. Consequently, it is envisaged that this will help
scholars and political scientists who are studying electoral institutions to con-
textualize the event and appraise it against the democratic ethic that Africa is
aspiring towards. The election, as a model, can either be accepted or rejected
in contributing to the improvement of domestic or regional systems.2 The
limitation of this paper is that during the election, the writer was only an
unaccredited observer. As such, it was not possible to gain access into polling
stations or to formally interview the main actors in the election. Thus, much
reliance was placed on information from the Zimbabwe Human Rights (N.G.O.)
Forum (Z.H.R.F. or the Forum), newspaper reports, the Internet and reports
from international groups, aside from the traditional forms of information
gathering.3
B. The importance of elections
Granted that the reasons that the international community was drawn to the
Zimbabwean election may not have been entirely selfless; this concern is based
1. Allegations from different comers were made regarding the state of human rights in the pre-and
post-2000 Parliamentary election period. See e.g., Zimbabwe: Terror Tactics in the Run-up to the Parlia-
mentary Elections, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, June 2000; Rule of Law, The LAw SOCIETY OF ZIMBABWE
MAGAZINE, 2000, at 5; Law Society of Zimbabwe; B. Raftopoulos, Politics in Zimbabwer-2001: Confronting
the Crisis, Address at the Crisis in Zimbabwe Conference, (Aug. 4, 2001) (transcript is on file with the author).
2. Individual aspects of the election may be dealt with likewise.
3. HUMAN RIGHTS AND ZIMBABWE'S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, The Zimbabwe Human Rights
Forum (March 2002), at http://www.hrforumzim.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter THE FORUM].




on the fact that democratic practices are not only important but must be
monitored.4 Thus, in this age of globalization, no country is an island. If
Country X does not measure up to democratic behavior, there may be a ripple
effect that impact not only the region, but on the whole world.
It is now axiomatic that one of the fundamental prerequisites for any
democratic transition is free and fair elections.5 Indeed, some scholars go as far
as to say that the notion of democracy, involving the two aspects of "free and
fair elections" and "good governance" has become a global norm.6 It is ad-
mitted that the notion of democracy and all its corollaries like the rule of law
and good governance has not yet found universal acceptance, let alone inter-
pretation.7 Nonetheless, it cannot be gainsaid that the notion of democracy,
involving the two aspects of "free and fair elections" and good governance has
become established in the course of the 1990's.8
Among other things, governance in the modern sense recognizes that the
will of the people should be central to how they must be ruled.9 Like elsewhere,
the outcome of the 2002 election in Zimbabwe was expected to reflect the will
of the majority of the people since the citizens have a right to determine their
own existence and to choose who should preside over their day-to-day life in
their pursuit of fulfillment and happiness. 10 This will of the people is reflected
in the doctrine of free and fair elections.
4. The ruling party and its friends argued that American and European interests, especially that of
the British, was actuated not because of any concern for democracy but because of a 'satanic conspiracy' to
return white supremacy and prevent the land redistribution exercise in which prime land belonging to white
commercial farmers was being acquired reportedly for redistribution to landless blacks. See generally, 28
PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe) (2002) 4:4128-9; 28 PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe)
(2002) 46:4136.
5. Larry Diamond, Globalisation of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes and Prospects Centre for
Democratic Studies 17 (quoting R. DAHL, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY: LINKAGES AND
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS).
6. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, 1996 REPORT OF
THE DEMOCRACY FORUM 2 (1996) [hereinafter I.D.E.A.].
7. J.A. WISEMAN, THENEW STRUGGLE FORDEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 7-8 (Ashgate, Aldershot 1996).
8. I.D.E.A., supra note 6.
9. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine Elections, G.A. Res. 137,
UN GAOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/137 (1991).
10. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at art. XXI(3), U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(A)(m1)
(1948) [hereinafter U.D.H.R.].
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1. Free and fair elections
It is unlikely to be seriously contested that free and fair elections are a
human right." Indeed, the elements of freedom and fairness in elections per-
vade all international and regional legal instruments. 2 Elections should also be
free and fair so that the rights and interests of the governed are protected. 13
The right of individuals to determine their own fate will remain a sham if
they are not granted the necessary environment in which to exercise that right
freely and without unnecessary impediments. Thus, state parties, in this case
Zimbabwe, are bound to hold genuine and periodic elections "guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors."' 4 State parties are also bound to
ensure that representatives are "freely-chosen."15 Apart from protecting the
individual, these requirements are also designed to give legitimacy to the politi-
cal system and to enhance democracy. In this respect, they are a motivation to
contribute to the development process. 16
It should also be observed that the idea of freeness protects the voters not
only at the time of voting, but also stretches back to the pre-election period.'7
As a consequence, the principle of free elections is closely linked to the funda-
mental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, expression, and association
as well as assembly; and freedom from discrimination. 8 These essential free-
doms are also protected in the African Charter. 9
Lastly in this respect, it is also observed that the idea of freedom in the
electoral process contemplates a political environment that is not manipulative.
It envisages a situation where there is greater freedom of the media to operate
11. G. TOTEMEYER & D. KADIMA, ELECTORAL INSTITUTE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, SADC OBSERVER
HANDBOOK 3 (2000).
12. See generally, United Nations Framework for Strengthening the Rule of Law, available at
www.arts.mcgill.ca/programmes/polisc/unsco-ruleoflaw.html (last visited July 15, 2002); see also, U.D.H.R,
supra note 10, at art. 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
G.A.O.R., 21st Sess., (1996) [hereinafter I.C.C.P.R.].
13. Context and objectives of UN electoral assistance, at www.un.org/Depts/dpa/ead/websites (last
visited Aug. 13, 2002).
14. I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art. 25(b),
15. African [Banjul] Charter on Human and People's Rights, July 20, 1979, art. 13, 21 I.L.M. 58
[hereinafter African Charter]; see also UDHR, supra note 10, at art. 21(1); I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art.
25(a).
16. Part One of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation
(the African Charter for Development).
17. See generally, G.S. GOODWIN GILL, FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1994).
18. M. NOWAK, CCPR COMMENTARY 449 (N.P. Engel Publishers 1993)
19. African Charter, supra note 15, at art. 2, 8-11.
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without undue influence or hindrance. G. Feltoe sets out some of the consider-
ations that could negate the freeness and fairness of an election as where:
a) Campaigning by a political party is prevented or seriously obstructed;
b) Voters are intimidated or bribed;
c) The electoral laws give an unfair advantage to one of the political
parties contesting the election;
20
d) There is rigging of the elections.2
It follows from the above therefore that the notion of freedom in elections
is a prerequisite for democracy. It basically denotes an environment wherein
voters have the freedom to participate in elections the way they want without
fear of adverse effects on their and/or their families' safety, welfare, or general
dignity and without coercion and restrictions.22
It may also be added that fairness means that the rules of the game are
clearly spelled out for all contesting parties to know what is at stake. The
elections must also be held in respect to the principles of universal and equal
suffrage, paying attention to the right to equality.23 These requirements are
widely captured in international and regional legal instruments.
2. The international and regional instruments governing elections
Many conventions, declarations and protocols provide for free, fair and
genuine elections. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(I.C.C.P.R.) makes provision for open elections, as does the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (C.E.R.D.).24 Zimbabwe is
20. Transparency establishing the legal ground rules in an inclusive and open manner is necessary.
THE ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, THE O.D.I.H.R. ELECTION OBSERVATION
HANDBOOK 7 (1999).
21. G. Feltoe, An unfair contest: The Presidential Elections in Zimbabwe, in 6 ZIMBABWE HUMAN
RIGHTS BULLETIN 81 (2002). (Electoral fraud vitiates or even perverts the will of the people.)
22. This is the requirement for the secrecy of the ballot.
23. Any restriction to the right to vote should be reasonable; not discriminatory. See G.A. Re. 137,
U.N. G.A.O.R., 46th Sess., U.N. Doc A/RES/46/137 (1991); I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art. 25(b).
Restriction on the grounds of residency was upheld by the European Commission, see App. Mo. 7566176, 9
Eur. Comm'n H.P. Dec. & Rep. 121 (1976). See also M. Nowak, supra note 18, at 449.
24. G.A. Res. 2106, U.N. G.A.O.R., 20th Sess., arts. 5, 25 (1965); see also Convention on the
Political Rights of Women, Dec. 20, 1952, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
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a party to these two conventions.25 It also ratified the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights.26
For the purposes of this inquiry, it suffices to say that all the instruments
cited above basically make provisions for the conduct of regular (or periodic),
genuine (or free and fair) elections, mostly by secret ballot. However, it is
interesting to note that unlike the European and American conventions, the
African Charter is silent on the issue of secrecy of the ballot. It is also
remarkable that of the regional instruments, it is only the American Convention
that makes a direct reference to the question of suffrage. 7 The Charter may also
be compared to the American Convention, which adds a right to be elected.2"
Evaluated against international and regional instruments the African
charter therefore "stands out as meager and without substantial legal content"
with regard to the right to vote. Moreover, the right is to be exercised "in accor-
dance with the provisions of national laws." It may be noted however that there
is no clear check or limitation on the import or operation of national legislation,
leaving wide discretion to the individual state. 29 This leads us to examine the
extent to which sovereignty, as contested by the government of Zimbabwe, can
preclude international interest in domestic elections.
3. Sovereignty and elections
The state party to the international instruments setting out the rules and
standards for the conduct of elections has some modicum of latitude to conduct
elections within the parameters of its own laws. 30 The United Nations recog-
nized sovereignty in its Resolution on "respect for the principles of national
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of states in their electoral
processes."'"
25. CHRISTOF HEYNS, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA I (Kluwer Law Intenrational 1996 Series,
1996). In the regional sphere, Article 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, Article 20
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Article 23 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol I make provision for
open elections.
26. Id. at5.
27. American Convention on Human and Peoples' Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. XXIII(l)(b), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
28. Id.
29. LONE LINDHOLT, QUESTIONING THE UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE AFRICAN CHARTER
ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA, MALAWI AND MOZAMBIQUE 156 (DARTMOUTH PUBLISHING
Co.) (1997).
30. The principle of sovereignty has been codified in, among others, Article Two of the United
Nations Charter.
31. U.N.G.A. Res. 46/130 of 17 December 1991; see also U.N.G.A. Res. 47/130 of 18 December
1992 and U.N.G.A. Res. 48/124 of 20 December 1993.
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Although they are held within the limitations of domestic law and practice,
elections must be held in an environment that caters to the exercise of funda-
mental freedoms in accordance with international law. It seems incontrovertible
that on the global scene, the principle of sovereignty is and should indeed keep
on giving way to the principles of accountability, the observance of international
norms, and human rights.32 Sovereignty should never become a sanctuary for
dictatorship and human rights violations.
II. ZIMBABWE: A BRIEF POLITICAL BACKGROUND
The struggle for democracy and human dignity has its roots in the colonial
period of the country. The British formally colonized Zimbabwe in 1890. In
1893, the Anglo-Ndebele War erupted against the local Ndebele ethnic group
in the Matebeleland region. This war was actuated by the dispossession of
blacks of their land and cattle.
Shortly thereafter the Shona groups from Mashonaland joined the war and
by 1896, the conflagration had become so widespread that it was called The
First Chimurenga or "war of liberation." After the arrest and execution of the
Chimurenga leaders, further dispossession and oppression followed, the upshot
of which was that dissent spread commensurately.33
As a result, the trade union movement gave birth to several opposition
political parties. The Zimbabwe African National Union (Z.A.P.U.) was formed
in 1961 under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African
National Union (Z.A.N.U.) was formed in 1963 under the headship of
Ndabaningi Sithole34 as discontent with a political system that was premised on
the notion of white supremacy grew. Smith proclaimed a Unilateral Declaration
of Independence (U.D.I.) on November 11, 1965. 3' This move was designed to
perpetuate minority rule and is largely seen as the precipitator of the bitter
liberation struggle that was to follow: the Second Chimurenga.36 The guerrilla
war forced Smith to the negotiating table, culminating in the country's first
32. Admittedly, there is a lack of consensus about in which issues the international community has
the right to intervene. See generally, M. HEINBERG, SUBDUING SOVEREIGNTY: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT
To INTERVENE 136 (Pinter Publishers 1994). In his book Keeping a Fractured Peace, J.J. Holst observes
"[s]overeignty may in fact be waning more rapidly than widely presumed...."
33. For information about Zimbabwe, visit the Zimbabwe government website at
http://www.gta.gov.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
34. Subsequently led by President Mugabe as the First Secretary of the party.
35. The system was segregationist and the franchise was only extended incrementally until equal
and universal suffrage was obtained at independence in 1980.
36. GABRIELSHUMBAETAL., Report on the Presidential Election in Zimbabwe 4 (2002). The paper
was researched under the guidance of the Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, and is on file with
the Centre.
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majority vote in 1980. The elections were won by Z.A.N.U. (P.F.), uninterrupt-
edly the ruling party, and ushered in black majority rule.37
Although the country has never been a de jure one-party state, the ruling
party has completely dominated Zimbabwean politics since the Unity Accord
with Z.A.P.U. in 1987. However, it seems to have been shocked out of com-
placency when the Movement for Democratic Change under the leadership of
Morgan Tsvangirai almost won over half the contested seats in the June 2000
Parliamentary Elections. Compounded by the fact that the government had
suffered defeat when Zimbabweans rejected a government-sponsored draft
Constitution at a referendum earlier in the year, the tone of government official
speeches became ominous if not utterly menacing as the Presidential election
drew near.38
The legal regime for the elections
In evaluating the election, recourse should be had to the domestic legal
regime, in particular, the electoral law and the Constitution. The Constitution
provides for fundamental human rights.39 These include political rights like
freedom of conscience, expression, assembly and association, movement and
protection from discrimination.40 Other freedoms include the right to life, the
right to protection from inhumane treatment and the right to protection from
arbitrary search or entry.4'
The Constitution also provides for the election of the president in accor-
dance with the electoral law.42 To be elected to presidency, one must be a
citizen by birth or descent and should have attained forty years of age and be
ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe.43 The tenure of the office of the president is
limited to six years. It is however notable that the constitution is silent on the
duration of the term of office of the incumbent president in the event of his/her
being re-elected.
Section Sixty-one of the Constitution provides for the establishment of an
Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.). It may be observed that although
the Constitution provides for the registration of voters,44 it does not guarantee
37. Id. Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) won 116 out of the 120 contested seats.
38. See generally, The FORUM, supra note 3. (These speeches are extensively captured within.)
39. ZIMB. CONST., ch. M.
40. Id. §§ 19-23.
41. Id. §§ 12, 15, 17.
42. Id. at ch. V, § 2.
43. Id.
44. ZIMB. CONST., ch. VI, § 8.
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that those entitled to be registered will actually be registered as voters. It also
does not grant the right not to be prevented from casting the ballot.
The Electoral Act provides for regulations and procedures governing
parliamentary and presidential elections. 45 It makes provisions for the appoint-
ment of an Electoral Directorate (the E.D.), the functions of which include
"giving instructions and making recommendations" for "ensuring that elections
are conducted efficiently, properly, freely and fairly."4 6 It also regulates the
procedure and conditions of service of the E.S.C. and Registrar-General of
Elections (the R-G) as well as the registration of voters. The Act also provides
for the functions of the R-G who is subject to the direction of the E.D.47
1. The Election Directorate (E.D.)
The E.D. consists of a chairman appointed by the President, the Registrar-
General and no fewer than two, or more than ten other members. The Minister
of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs appoints the ten others. Any other
person assigned for the administration of the Act in terms of Section Three may
also assume the Minister's responsibility.48 It would seem that the composition
of the E.D. does not augur well for guaranteeing free and fair elections. Ulti-
mately, the President appoints members in one way or another. In practice, it
has often been shown that the E.D.'s partiality in handling contentious elections
is suspect.49
The E.D. was chaired, ex officio, by Mariyawanda Nzuwa (appointed by
President Robert Mugabe) and the Registrar-General (Tobaiwa Mudede). Who
exactly comprised the E.D.'s other members in March 2002 was not clear.
However, the Police Commissioner sat together with the E.D. Chair and the R-G
at the table from which the results were announced.5°
2. The Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.)
An Electoral Supervisory Commission (E.S.C.) is established by Section
Sixty-One of the Constitution. The President, in consultation with the Judicial
Service Commission, appoints a chairperson and two other members.5' Two
45. Electoral Act, Zimb., at http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/Zimbabwe/ElectoralAct.pdf. (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
46. Id. § 4.
47. Id. § 15(2)-(3).
48. Id. § 4.
49. See generally, THE FORUM, supra note 3, Angela P. Cheater (2001).
50. Id.
51. ZIMB. CONST., ch. LXI(1).
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additional members are "appointed by the President after consultation with the
Speaker."52
It should be noted that although the President must consult, he or she is not
required to adopt recommendations given to him/her. The President also
decides the tenure of office of the Commissioners. 3 Furthermore, members
hold office "on such conditions as the President may fix" and the President may
remove them from such office 4.5 Thus, the impartiality of the E.S.C.- appointed
by the President- remains suspect. Practice has also generated suspicions that
the E.S.C. panders to political considerations although the Constitution provides
for its independence.
Together with the R-G, the E.S.C. is responsible for conducting presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections. Still, it is interesting that neither the Electoral
Act nor the Constitution specifically grants the E.S.C. a mandate to conduct
elections for presidency.
The E.S.C. appeared to be inadequately geared to discharge its constitu-
tional mandate as only four of the five required E.S.C. members were appoint-
ed.56 The President appointed retired army colonel, ex-combatant, and lawyer
Sobusa Gula-Ndebele as the Chair.5 7 In turn, the Chair of the E.S.C. appointed
as Director of Elections brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba. 58  Seventy-two
Zimbabwe National Army officers were reportedly seconded to the E.S.C. One
thousand eighty election supervisors and 22,000 election monitors were mostly
recruited from the ministries of defense, home affairs and education. 9
It would appear that the selection of electoral officers was not transparent
and inclusive. A balance could have been attained by also including people
from other sectors of the national spectrum to give the impression of independ-
ence. In Lesotho, for example, officers of the Independent Electoral Commis-
52. Id.
53. Electoral Act, supra note 45, at art. § 7.
54. Id. §§ 7, 10.
55. ZIMB. CONST., ch. LXI(6). In 2002, the United Parties resolved to boycott the election until
amendments were made to the Electoral Act and the Registrar-General was precluded from conducting voter
registration. See also Angela Cheater, A Baseline Report in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, ZIMBABWE
HUMAN RIGHTS BULLETIN, Jan.-June 2000, at 66.
56. See generally THE FORUM, supra note 3.
57. He took over after Peter Hatendi resigned in protest over funding and other inadequacies.
58. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 14, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003).
59. See THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 31, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
[Vol. 10:95
sion (I.E.C.) came from diverse backgrounds.6 Moreover, the law was amended
willy-nilly to favor the ruling party, as will be seen below.
3. Changes to the electoral law
The President used his wide powers three times6' under the Electoral Act
to promulgate laws that were detrimental to the opposition.62 One such law was
the General Laws Amendment Act (G.L.A.A.). 63 The G.L.A.A. made extensive
amendments to the Electoral Act. It was described by the opposition as
"undemocratic and contrary to the S.A.D.C. Parliamentary Forum Norms and
Standards for Elections in the S.A.D.C. Region."'  The Minister of Justice,
Legal and Parliamentary Affairs described the amendments as designed "to kick
out from our politics the influence of foreign money and foreign interests" and
to prevent private organizations from conducting voter education.65
Also contentious was a provision in the G.L.A.A., which empowered the
Registrar-General to change voters' registration particulars without informing
them.' It was feared that it facilitated rigging of the voter roll by moving voters
between constituencies without their knowledge or even throwing them off the
roll altogether. After the Supreme Court nullified the G.L.A.A., 67 an Electoral
Amendment bill was introduced carrying identical provisions.68
4. Evaluation
It may be observed that the electoral institutions for the election were not
independent, at least in principle. International standards for transparency,
freeness and fairness of the electoral process can normally be enforced when,
among other things, the selection of electoral officers and the setting up of
institutions is seen as unbiased. Charges to the electoral law that fly in the face
of court judgments may only have one purpose: to favor the ruling party at the
60. LESOTHO COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP REPORT, General Election May 25, 2002, at
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/dynamic/press-office/display.asp?id=480&type=press&cat=57 (last visited
Oct. 11, 2003) [hereinafter Lesotho Report]. Lesotho held its General election on the 25th of May 2002.
61. See Statutory Instruments, in, Zimbabwe Presidential Elections, REPORT OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OBSERVER GROUP, Mar. 9-11, 2002 [hereinafter COMMONWEALTH].
62. See Electoral Act, supra note 45, § 158. This section gives the President powers to make
statutory instruments that s/he "considers necessary or desirable to ensure that any election is properly and
efficiently conducted and to deal with any matter or situation .. "
63. General Laws Amendment Act § 2 (2002) [hereinafter G.L.A.A.].
64. 28 PARL. DEB. (The Parliament of Zimbabwe) (2002) 35:3135.
65. See generally, THE FORUM, supra note 3.
66. See ZIMB. CONST., ch. XXXIV(1).
67. See COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 23.
68. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, at 4.
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detriment of the opposition.69 However, this on its own should not be taken in
isolation to arrive at any conclusion on the freeness or otherwise of the election.
There are other stages that are crucial to an electoral process, as those analyzed
hereunder.
Ill. THE PRE-ELECTION SCENARIO
A. Voter education
Unlike the position regarding the 2000 parliamentary election, the
government outlawed the provision of voter education by civil society and made
it a preserve of the E.S.C. The E.S.C., however, could delegate its responsibil-
ity and supply material to whomever it granted the permission to carry out voter
education.7 °
The G.L.A.A. also banned foreign contributions or donations for the
purposes of voter education to anyone except the Electoral Supervisory Com-
mission. 7' This restricted the participation of civil society in voter education
and deprived voters of their freedom of information. This provision was not as
illogical as it might seem considering that the E.SC. was short on resources.
Since education is power, it is arguable that the government had a reason
to want the electorate to remain ignorant in the face of mounting economic
problems and what promised to be a stiff election. It is notable, however, that
these provisions were largely ignored as the Zimbabwe Election Support Net-
work (Z.E.S.N.) and others continued to distribute pamphlets. 72 Thus, although
the G.L.A.A. had the potential to, and did prejudice voters, the effect was not
fatal in terms of voter education.73
B. Voter registration
On January 31, 2002, the nomination day for the presidential election, the
E.S.C. announced that 5,479,100 people were registered on the voters roll.74
The official government newspaper, The Herald, announced that, of those
69. In Lesotho, electoral laws were only changed to facilitate the smooth running of elections in
view of the compromises made by the contestants.
70. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, at 14D(4), (6).
71. Id. § 14D(5).
72. Lesotho Report, supra note 60.
73. It may also be noted that the Civic Alliance for Social and Economic (C.A.S.E.P.) and the Legal
Projects Centre (L.P.C.) continued to educate people on their rights in spite of the G.L.A.A.
74. The Forum reports that the M.D.C. claimed to have uncovered 524 duplications and 107
deceased voters still registered on the roll.
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registered, 3.2 million were urban voters and 2.2 million rural voters. 75 The
government later altered the figure to reflect the presence of 3.2 million rural
voters and 2.2 million urban voters. This is significant because the ruling party
believed its support base was the rural area.76
It is alleged that the office of the Registrar-General declined to publicize
the number of voters registered in each constituency on the grounds that the
information was confidential. 77 Furthermore, the R-G is also alleged to have
refused to release the final roll used in the election.78 This caused disquietude
within the opposition as it was argued that the roll could be used to manipulate
the outcome of the vote. Some commentators claimed that this anomaly
reflected the fact that the roll had not been updated, leaving "a vast reservoir of
fictional voters who can then be mobilized at will when the going gets tough.,
79
This secretiveness was hardly in the spirit of transparency and had the potential
to vitiate the fairness of the election, contrary to international expectations.
C. Complaints with regards to registration
The Human Rights Forum observes that the fundamental rights to vote and
equality were compromised. It also observed that the effects of the G.L.A.A.
and other subsequent laws was to disenfranchise Zimbabwean citizens of
foreign descent and those previously entitled to postal votes. Moreover, proce-
dural complexities also resulted in most people being deprived of their right to
register, and therefore, their right to vote.
Disenfranchisement occasioned by failure to secure national identification
was particularly rampant among women married under customary law and the
youth. Chiefs and headmen (under the pay of the ruling party) became a con-
duit for securing national identity cards (IDs) for the purposes of registration.
Tendai Shumba, of Magunje (Hurungwe district) failed to secure a national ID
reportedly because she did not take a letter of recommendation from Z.A.N.U.
(P.F.) officials. 80
It is also reported that numerous roadblocks were set up by Z.A.N.U. (P.F.)
supporters to dispossess people of their identity cards so that they could not
prove their membership to the ruling party. The Forum also reported that, by
the time of voting, about 1,300 national identity cards had been reportedly
stolen in the districts of Mutoko, Tsholotsho, Nkayi, Bulilimamangwe South,
75. See THE HERALD, Mar. 12, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
76. See THE HERALD, Mar. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
77. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 10, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
78. See THE HERALD, Mar. 7, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw. (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
79, See THE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
80. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 7, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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Kwekwe and Buhera North. Such extensive disenfranchisement impacted the
freeness and fairness of the election.
Other "stringent" provisions that may have contributed to the disenfran-
chisement of voters were the proof of residence requirements in the G.L.A.A.'
Many people in the urban areas (touted to be the opposition M.D.C. stronghold)
were either homeless or could not obtain proof of residence. Many expatriates
intending to come to Zimbabwe to vote were likewise disenfranchised.82
Approximately 22,000 prisoners in jail could not vote either, although there is
no legal impediment for those on remand or those serving six months or less.
In contrast, all prisoners were allowed to vote at independence in 1980.
Students were also among those to suffer disenfranchisement. Those who
had been registered at tertiary institutions found that they could not vote as the
Ministry of Higher Education gave instructions that the institutions remain
closed during the election. Students attempting to vote at polling stations near
their institutions were reportedly turned away.83
In addition, amendments that were introduced to the Citizenship Act' were
also used to disenfranchise a majority of the electorate who held dual citizen-
ship. It is reported that the R-G refused to re-instate those who had successfully
applied to the courts against these amendments.85 There were also allegations
of procedural irregularities like registration after the roll had been closed or by
the underage. 6
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to verify all allegations, surely
some of these complaints must have a basis in fact. It would seem that most of
them were founded, as the government did little to counter them. Violations,
and willful manipulation of the law is difficult to dispute. Such a scenario
offends the standards for elections as contemplated in the international instru-
ments adverted to previously.8
81. G.L.A.A., supra note 63, § 3(e)-(f). It is generally felt that the G.LA.A. placed "unreasonable"
demands on the electorate.
82. See THE ZIMBABWE STANDARD, Mar. 10, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11,2003).
83. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 2, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003)
(quoting the Zimbabwe National Students Union (Z.I.N.A.S.U.)).
84. See The Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act, § 4:01 (1990).
85. Lesotho Report, supra note 60.
86. See generally, The Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum, at http://www.hrforumzim.conspecial-
inhrru/Election (last visited July 30, 2002).
87. See also Southern African Development Community (S.A.D.C.) Parliamentary Forum, Norms
and Standards for Elections in the SADC region. (Zimbabwe is a member of S.A.D.C.)
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IV. THE ELECTIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS
A. The freedoms of expression and information
The right of freedom of expression is protected in the Constitution."8 As
was the case in Lesotho' s General Elections, the state-controlled media devoted
most of their coverage to the ruling party. In Zimbabwe, however, the situation
was more serious. To begin with, the media was clearly polarized between the
independent press and the state-controlled press.8 9 The former seemed to favor
the opposition, although most of them strove for balance. The government con-
trolled media was however glaringly partisan. For example not a single state-
controlled newspaper, radio or television ran any advertisement for the opposi-
tion when the private press would advertise the ruling party.9°
Even more repugnant, the state-controlled media often invented stories to
paint the opposition in a bad light.91 In fact, the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cor-
poration (Z.B.C.) was subsequently accused of not adhering to basic standards
of journalism in their support for the ruling party.92 The Media Monitoring
Project issued a report of the news bulletins carried by the television from
December 1, 2002 to March 7, 2002. It observed that ninety-four percent
favored Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) while the remainder was negatively slanted against the
opposition.93
Unlike the case with Lesotho, incidents of violence against media house
and personnel were not uncommon during the Zimbabwean election. Offices
and printing houses of The Daily News were bombed several times by suspected
ruling party supporters. Independent publications were 'banned' from such
areas as Bindura, Karoi and Masvingo, all strongholds of the ruling party.94
Vendors of these publications were invariably assaulted or tortured.
The law was also used to make it difficult for the media to freely inform
the populace. Laws like the Public Order and Security Act (P.O.S.A.), 95 as well
88. ZIMB. CONST. § 20; see also U.D.H.R., supra note 10, at 19; I.C.C.P.R., supra note 12, at art.
19.
89. See generally, Media Monitoring Project (2001), in http://www.kabissa.org/lists/newsletter-
submissions-1/0876.html; R. Saunders, (1999) A History of the Media in Zimbabwe.
90. ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM, (2002) Human Rights and Zimbabwe's Presidential
Election: Mar. 2002, at 15.
91. G. Feltoe, supra note 21, at 83-84; See also SUNDAY MAIL, Feb. 24, 2002 and Mar. 3, 2002; see
also THE HERALD, Feb. 11, 2002.
92. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
93. FORUM, supra note 3, at 18.
94. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
95. Public Orders & Security Act, ch. 11:17.
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as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Bill (now an act), were
often used to arrest journalists for publishing "false statements, which are
peddled internationally.
96
In summary on this issue, it may be observed that ruling party supporters
deliberately violated the rights of media personnel as well as the electorate.
Opposition parties were denied coverage in the state-owned media. As if that
was not enough, laws were introduced to curtail the right of expression as well
as its attendant right to receive information. Where the playing field is not
level, elections cannot be said to be genuine, free and fair. Next, we look at the
level at which other basic rights were respected during the election.
B. Freedoms of association and assembly
The Constitution protects these two freedoms.97 The African Commission
in John D Ouko v Kenya also held freedom of association sacrosanct. 98 Like-
wise, the Commission affirmed freedom of assembly as a fundamental political
right in Sir Dawda K. Jawara v The Gambia.99 However, these freedoms seem
to have been trampled upon during the Zimbabwean election.
The introduction of the P.O.S.A. heralded the intensification of a series of
violations.'0 Summarized, P.O.S.A. made it illegal to hold political meetings
without advance notice and permission of the police. It also prohibited state-
ments likely to cause 'ridicule' to the President. A month after its promulga-
tion, forty-two people had been arrested under the Act. The Forum notes that
none of them were ruling party supporters.' 0'
While President Mugabe addressed fifty major rallies, Tsvangirai could
only address eight as the police mostly refused to grant permission on the
grounds that they feared for public security.'0 2 In White City Stadium in
Bulawayo, the police fired tear gas to disperse M.D.C. supporters after clashes
with Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) sympathizers who invaded the stadium.' 3 Subsequently,
96. P. Chinamasa, as recorded in 28 PARL. DEB. (Parliament of Zimbabwe) 39:3547.
97. ZIMB. CONST., ch. § XXI. See also U.D.H.R., supra note 10, at art. XX; I.C.C.P.R., supra note
12, at arts. XXI, XXI.
98. Communication 232/99, http://www.achpr.org/html/communications.html.
99. Communication 149/96, http:// www.achpr.org/html/communications.html.
100. Public Order & Security Act, supra note 95. Violations included freedom of association. See
generally, Report of the South African Parliamentary Observer Mission 9, Mar. 9-11, 2002, http://www.
gov.za/issues/zimreport.htm. [hereinafter S.A.P.O.M.]. Although the group held (amid disagreements) that
the election was "a credible expression of the will of the people," their observations seem to controvert the
conclusion.
101. THE FORUM, supra note 3, at 23.
102. Id.
103. See THE DAtLY NEWS, Feb. 1, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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the M.D.C. had to obtain an injunction against the police.'O° There were also
reports that police asked for national IDs before allowing people to attend rallies
addressed by M.D.C. Those with no cards were allegedly turned away.
10 5
C. Freedom from violence and intimidation
Political violence impedes the elector's ability to participate freely in the
electoral process. The electors can either be deterred from voting or may be
unduly influenced in their choice.10 6 Violence was the most outstanding occur-
rence in the Zimbabwean election. In most instances, it appeared to have been
incited by the ruling party. The opposition M.D.C. was the principal target, but
civil society and churches were not spared. We must, however, mention that the
opposition itself was not above perpetrating violence.0 7 Nonetheless, the ruling
party employed the full weight of the 'war veterans' and state agents in order
to win the election.
Political violence on such a scale had never been experienced before the
2000 Constitutional referendum and Parliamentary election.1'0 Inflammatory
statements from the leadership of the ruling party worsened it. President
Mugabe was quoted boasting that his party had several "degrees in violence."
He also urged his supporters to wage "a real war" on the M.D.C."°9 "The war
is going to be physical," he said.°"0
Following a request by S.A.D.C., he eventually made an appeal for an end
to violence, arguing that it was drawing international attention."' After the
European Union (E.U.) and the Commonwealth mounted the pressure, the
President made further calls for an end to violence." 2  The governor for
104. See THE FINANCIAL GAZETTE, Jan. 27, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
105. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 4, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
106. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 7.
107. Id.
108. Evidence of the massive violence and intimidation came to light in the cases following the
disputed 2000 Parliamentary Elections. See generally Mutoko South Election Petition, HH 68/2001,
ZIMBABWE REPORT 14, June 20, 2002; Hurungwe East Election Petition and Silas Matamisa v. Phillip
Chiyangwa and Registrar General of elections HH48/2001. See also S. Moyo (2001) 'The rule of law in
Zimbabwe' Paper presented to the Canadian Bar Association Annual General Meeting which is on file with
the author.
109. See THE FINANCIAL GAzET E, Jan. 10, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11,
2003).
110. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
111. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
112. See THE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
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Manicaland is also reported to have called for a peaceful campaign." 3 These
pleas did nothing to stop the tide as party youths trained under the national
youth service, known as the "green bombers" for their military-style uniforms,
continued to set up roadblocks and terrorize the people.
The "war veterans" and the "green bombers" also set up terror "bases"
where victims would be tortured or "re-educated"." 4 Several deaths and dis-
appearances were reported." 5  In the Midlands, an M.D.C. supporter was
allegedly beheaded with a spade. Another victim had the letters M.D.C. carved
with a knife on his back." 6 Gang rapes were not uncommon against suspected
opposition supporters." 7 In stark contrast, Tsvangirai appealed for reason and
resort to the law." 8
Tsvangirai's faith in the rule of law was however misplaced, as the
Zimbabwe Republic Police (Z.R.P.) was clearly partisan in enforcing the law."9
In fact, it has been said, "[slympathizing with the opposition became a sure way
of having normal life disrupted by the law enforcement agents."120 In Chivi
District, police fired live bullets and hurled teargas at Tsvangirai' s convoy after
he stopped to greet supporters lining the roadside.' 2 ' This was not the first or
last time the police harassed him or his supporters.'22 Today, the M.D.C.
president faces two counts of treason, whereas senior Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) officials
perpetrate violence and incite mayhem with impunity during elections.
113. See THE ZIMBABWE STANDARD, Jan. 27, 2002, at http://www.standard.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
114. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 1, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003).
115. The Forum catalogues a total of 56 reported politically motivated deaths. THE FORUM, supra
note 3, at 97-100.
116. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
117. Id. This writer has assisted some of these victims and has also suffered torture at the hands of
state agents. Such mindless violence is still continuing at the time of writing.
118. See THE ZIMBABWE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 2002, at http://www.mweb.co.zw (last visited Oct.
11, 2003); THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
119. This has been going on since the Constitutional referendum in which the government's
sponsored Draft Constitution was rejected, see for example The Human Rights Observer 'Deterioration of the
rule of law in Zimbabwe'; Norwegian Election Observation Mission (2002 Presidential Elections in
Zimbabwe 2002, Preliminary Report Issued on 12 March 2002 p 3 and G. FELTOE, The Onslaught Against
the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe (2001) (Paper presented to the South African Institute of International Affairs,
Johannesburg).
120. ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION, ZIMBABWE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 2002 REPORT
3 (2002) [hereinafter ZIMRIGHTS].
121. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. !1, 2003).
122. See THE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7-8, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
[Vol. 10:95
Shumba
V. POLLING AND POST-ELECTION SCENARIO
Although there were incidents of gross human rights abuses in the run-up
to the election, it is encouraging that the election days were generally peace-
ful. 123 However, police fired teargas in Kuwadzana, Harare to dispel voters who
had become impatient with the slow pace of the election process. A large
number of people could not vote in the M.D.C. strongholds of Harare and
Chitungwiza as a result of the reduction of polling stations in urban areas. The
reduction amounted to about thirty to forty percent. 24
Even though verification and counting was delayed, the process was con-
ducted smoothly and according to procedure, as was the case in Lesotho.
Notwithstanding that, prior irregularities had marred the whole process. For
example, it is reported that the uniformed forces' voting was done in the pre-
sence of senior officers and was therefore not secret and subject to influence.'
"Numerous M.D.C. agents were kidnapped, injured or arrested or had their cars
stoned or taken away," making it impossible to supervise the process.'26
Furthermore, in Kuwadzana, "war veterans" allegedly assaulted and dis-
persed voters while wielding guns. 27 It is not surprising, therefore, that the out-
come of the election has not been accepted by the main opposition party, which
has filed suit. More importantly, the European Union and the United States
have imposed targeted sanctions against senior members of the ruling party.
VI. WHAT WENT WRONG?
A. The electoral system
In analyzing the Zimbabwean anomaly, it is fitting to make a brief
comparison with other countries. 2 8 Lesotho 2002 elections and Ghana 2000
elections were remarkable for the peacefulness. In Lesotho, it has been mooted
that this was because of the new electoral system that was introduced.'2 9
Zimbabwe uses the First Past the Post (F.P.P.) or "winner takes all"
electoral arrangement. It cannot be said that the choice of a political model is
merely important. Apart from its impact on the "representativeness, legitimacy
123. This writer was an unofficial observer on behalf of the Centre for Human Rights, University of
Pretoria.
124. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61, at 16.
125. ZIMRIGHTS, supra note 120, at 5.
126. Feltoe, supra note 21, at 92.
127. See THE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11, 2002, at http://www.herald.co.zw (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
128. This writer has observed several elections, including the Lesotho 2002 ones.
129. The Mixed Member Proportional Representation system.
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and stability of the government born of it,"'3° the choice of a model is also
important in that it shapes the limitations and expectations of the contestants and
steers their conduct with respect to human rights. For example in the F.F.P.
system the stakes are high in the sense that the loser loses everything. Knowing
this, parties and individuals are liable to use unethical and unlawful means to
win the election. Since elections have been held relatively peacefully (in Ghana
for instance) using the F.F.P. system, the choice of an electoral model should
not be overemphasized. Even in Lesotho, where a new model was introduced,
it must not be forgotten that it was used on a limited scale. There are other vital
considerations to be taken into account.
B. The lack of transparency in Zimbabwe
Perhaps the most serious cause of violence in Zimbabwe was the lack of
openness accompanying the electoral process. For instance, the registration pro-
cess reopened three times, amid claims by the opposition that there was
insufficient publicity of the event.13 The electoral laws that had been the hall-
mark of past elections were often changed haphazardly. The courts sometimes
struck down some of the laws but nevertheless, the same provisions would be
returned in the form of other laws.'32 In instances such as these, it is likely that
both the electorate and the contestants would be driven to unlawful means out
of sheer frustration or even to compliment an apparently anarchical process.
The refusal to grant accreditation to both domestic and foreign observers
that the Zimbabwean government perceived as unfriendly worsened the
situation. 3 3 It also seemed to give credence to the fact that the process was
flawed. 1
34
Also important is the fact that in Lesotho, the "rules of the game" were
clearly defined. The opposition had been included in the negotiations surround-
ing the post-1998 electoral preparations. This was in sharp contrast to the
"ostracization" of the opposition in Zimbabwe. Thus, more because of the
"inclusivity" of the development in Lesotho rather than the new electoral
system, the election went smoothly.
130. N.L. Mahao, Electoral System and Legitimacy of Representation, (2000) 10 LEsOTHO L.J. 245
(2002); see also S.N. Ndengwa, The Relevance of the Electoral System: A simulation of the 1992 Kenyan
Election, 2 AFR. L.J. POL. SCI. 14 (1997).
131. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 61.
132. For example the General Laws Amendment Act was stuck down by the courts to be returned
a barely two weeks later in the form of the Electoral Amendment Bill (number 4 of 2002).
133. The local Zimbabwe Election Support Network (Z.E.S.N.) applied to field 12,500 observers but
was only allowed 500. The twenty-three strong delegation of NGOs from South Africa was refused
accreditation. The E.U. pulled out after its head of delegation had also been denied observer status.
134. Comparing Lesotho 2002 and Ghana 2000 elections.
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C. The advent of a strong opposition in Zimbabwe
It could be contented that the Zimbabwean election was strikingly different
because of the recent emergence of a strong official opposition. Unlike in
Lesotho, where the major opposition parties had been testing their strengths
against one another for a considerable period of time, the ruling party in
Zimbabwe had a history of dominance and complacency that made it appear
invincible. Although Z.A.N.U. (P.F.) seems to have a history of violence
against political opponents,'35 in 2002 the fear of loss was palpably existent, as
evidenced in the overreaction by the ruling party.'36 This apprehension could
only lead to desperate measures that would be an indictment to the whole
electoral course.
It should be noted further that unlike Lesotho, Zimbabwe has a very big
middle class, a student movement and civil society so strong that consciousness
was complementally high. Because of unparalleled economic woes-largely
the result of corruption and Economic Structural Adjustment Policies-students,
urbanites, and the middle class were the most poignant victims of the economic
downturn. This could only increase strife, as demonstrations became a daily
phenomenon. Believing it was under a siege of coup like proportions, the ruling
party increased strong-arm tactics.
D. The Land Question
Although no African state could be said to be liberated from problems
regarding the land issue, in Zimbabwe the clamor took on a serious tone in the
run up to the elections for various reasons. The liberation struggle (one of the
most bitter in the struggle for the decolonisation of Africa) was principally
premised on the land question.
The Lancaster House Constitution, which was negotiated in 1979, made it
practically impossible for the new black government to expedite the process of
redistribution. 137 Thus after the government failed to win support to solve the
land issue through what many perceived to be an unrepresentative, unjust and
discriminatory Constitutional overhaul, it mounted what was dubbed a "racist
campaign" against white farmers. They were accused of having sponsored the
135. Africa Watch (1989) Zimbabwe: A Break With the Past? The Africa Watch Committee pp 55-
76; see generally, ARNOLD, MILLIARD W. ET AL., Zimbabwe: Report on the 1985 General Elections (Inter-
national Human Rights Law Group Zimbabwe 1986); RicHARD SAUNDERS, NEVER THE SAME AGAIN:
ZIMBABWE'S GROWTH TOWARDS DEMOCRACY, 1980-2000, pp. 20-24.
136. Most statements by senior personnel in the government were astonishingly un-statesmanlike.
137. Jeffrey Herbst, 'The dilemmas of land policy in Zimbabwe' in Simon Baynham (1990) State
Politics in Zimbabwe: University of Zimbabwe Publications p 131.
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rejection of the draft Constitution in cahoots with the M.D.C., who were also
called "puppets" of Western influence and "Rhodies.' ' 8
This gospel of hate found its mark and spawned ruling party militants in
the form of "war veterans" and most unemployed youths who were willing to
go to extremes to advance the "Third Chimurenga." Thus, although other coun-
tries have their own land crisis, the demagoguery surrounding the issue in
Zimbabwe contributed to violence.
139
VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following from the above, it is our submission that an honest critique will
reach the conclusion that the 2002 Presidential election was not genuine, legiti-
mate, free, or fair. While there is little controversy over the genuineness of the
elections in Lesotho, the Zimbabwean process violated all the norms and stand-
ards, international or regional, expected in an election. It is sad, therefore, that
some observers opted to see no evil, hear no evil and speak no evil."4
In view of this, it is hoped that it is not a misplaced sense of brotherhood
or an "old-boy network of African strongmen," (as Philip Gourevitch calls it) 4 '
that makes African leaders stick together in the face of wanton human rights
violations. Now is the time to come up with clear, binding and enforceable
human rights protection protocols and mechanisms before the continent is
relegated to the dustbin of democratic competitiveness.
For the sake of progress and development, the continent should be courage-
ous enough to admit, condemn and rectify its shortfalls. Where praise is due,
as in the Lesotho election, it must be generously accorded. By the same token,
wherever intervention is necessary, as was arguably the case in Zimbabwe, the
international community should not hesitate to intervene. It is mainly because
nothing was done then that people continue to die today.
138. Zimbabwe was formerly Rhodesia under colonial rule.
139. South Africa, Kenya and Namibia are some of the countries where the land question has
manifested itself recently.
140. These include the Namibian, Kenyan and Tanzanian Government Observer Teams, the
C.O.M.E.S.A. Observer Team, the O.A.U. Observer Mission, the African Heads of (Diplomatic) Mission and
the S.A.D.C. Ministerial Task Force.
141. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR
FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 254 (Picador USA 1999).
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